Even though it sounds Draconian, there is a growing wave of business sages and government experts that are calling for the Feds to keep their bailout to themselves to allow for real change in Motown. I can certainly see their point.
One can hardly flip on the television in this country without being bombarded with opinions on the automotive crisis and the various observations flowing from the Congressional dog and pony show hearings with the respective CEOs of the Big Two-and-a-half Three. Some of the thoughts are driven by fear of drastic change — those are the folks in favor of quick government support in the form of loans or capital investment. Another group of voices condemns the collective management and labor groups for their alleged excesses and cowardice and proclaim that auto companies, like the dot com debacles eight or ten years before, should be left to fail so the jackals of the business world can pick the bones clean.
And then there are those that believe that bankruptcy is the way to save GM, Ford and Chrysler from themselves and their plodding ways. These folks aren’t just pundits looking for a way to get their name in the paper, either. They include:
- Jack Welch, the former Chairman and CEO of General Electric,
- Michael E. Levine, a distinguished executive and scholar that has served as Dean of the Yale School of Business and CEO or Chief of Operations for a few airlines in the United States,
- Douglas Baird, Professor of Law at the University of Chicago,
- Dr. Martin Feldstein of the Harvard School of Business, and
- Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts and CEO of Bain & Company.
(Well, Mitt might be doing this in part to get his name in the paper, but I’ll keep in mind that his father was Chairman of American Motors in the 1960′s.)
In my mind, Mr. Levine’s op ed piece in the Wall Street Journal is the most cogent argument of the bunch of bankruptcy advocates. He starts in by saying this:
After 42 years of eroding U.S. market share (from 53% to 20%) and countless announcements of “change,” GM still has eight U.S. brands…GM has about 7,000 dealers…GM is contractually required to support thousands of workers in the UAW’s “Jobs Bank” program, which guarantees nearly full wages and benefits for workers who lose their jobs due to automation or plant closure. It supports more retirees than current workers. It owns or leases enormous amounts of property for facilities it’s not using and probably will never use again…It has other contractual obligations such as health coverage for union retirees. All of these commitments drain its cash every month.
Right off the bat, Mr. Levine asserts that any loan aimed at more time for Big Three management just means more of the same maddening slow shuffle to oblivion. He goes on to say that GM has so many ties (dealers, retirees, labor, supplier/creditors, municipalities) that any bailout money would be gone before any real change could take shape:
Some obligations will be impossible to cut by voluntary agreement. GM will run out of cash and out of time.
Mr. Levine cites unhealthy labor and retiree costs that must be shed, the dealer networks that should be reduced by 70% or more, plants that should be shuttered despite the municipal bonds and loans, and suppliers that want their fat contracts to support their own bloated organizations as the reasons he advocates dramatic change through bankruptcy reorganization. He understands that if the government bailout goes through that these liabilities will not be affected in any urgent way and that the ultimate demise of GM, Ford and Chrysler would have only been delayed by a period of months.
On the other hand, he recognizes that the costs in the short term would be high. Very high.
Jack Welch and his current wife Suzy have written many of the same comments as Mr. Levine in their essay, but they add the novel twist of theorizing that General Motors and Chrysler, LLC should enter Chapter 11 bankruptcy together with the expressed purpose of reorganizing as one company to eliminate overhead and to eliminate competition. In their view, the emerging business would still own 25% of the North American market and would be poised to send huge shockwaves through an industry that is on “the beaten path of incrementalism”. This might be too risky and too cumbersome, both criticisms that Mr. Welch acknowledges will make the path difficult.
Finally, and perhaps most to the point, Dr. Feldstein opines:
Making U.S. automakers like GM viable to become competitive again “is going to require restructuring the wages and benefits they pay to auto workers,” he [Dr. Feldstein] told CNBC. “Whether that happens in bankruptcy or it’s done in another managed program, that has to happen.”
Staunchly, the CEOs of the Big Three deny that bankruptcy is even an option. Why? Mr. Douglas Baird, a law professor at the University of Chicago, offers this suggestion:
For Wagoner, any bankruptcy filing could cost him his job.
It would probably cost him is contractual golden parachute as well.
I’m not a business expert. I’m not even a car expert. However, I do know that corporate change comes at a pace that’s much too slow in virtually every case. After all, if change came fast enough, we wouldn’t see business after business in trouble in both good and bad economic times. Dramatic change must occur. I wish that everyone had the courage to make the sacrifices needed without bankruptcy. However, I don’t think that they do.



